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The need for evidence-based practice calls for research focussing not only on the effectiveness of in-
terventions and their translation into policies, but also on implementation processes and the factors
inﬂuencing them, in particular for complex health system policies. In this paper, we use the lens of one of
the health system's ‘building blocks’, human resources for health (HRH), to examine the implementation
of ofﬁcial policies on HRH incentives and the emergence of informal practices in three districts of Sierra
Leone. Our mixed-methods research draws mostly from 18 key informant interviews at district level.
Data are organised using a political economy framework which focuses on the dynamic interactions
between structure (context, historical legacies, institutions) and agency (actors, agendas, power re-
lations) to show how these elements affect the HRH incentive practices in each district. It appears that
the ofﬁcial policies are re-shaped both by implementation challenges and by informal practices emerging
at local level as the result of the district-level dynamics and negotiations between District Health
Management Teams (DHMTs) and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs). Emerging informal practices
take the form of selective supervision, salary supplementations and per diems paid to health workers,
and aim to ensure a better ﬁt between the actors' agendas and the incentive package. Importantly, the
negotiations which shape such practices are characterised by a substantial asymmetry of power between
DHMTs and NGOs. In conclusion, our ﬁndings reveal the inﬂuence of NGOs on the HRH incentive package
and highlight the need to empower DHMTs to limit the discrepancy between policies deﬁned at central
level and practices in the districts, and to reduce inequalities in health worker remuneration across
districts. For Sierra Leone, these ﬁndings are now more relevant than ever as new players enter the stage
at district level, as part of the Ebola response and post-Ebola reconstruction.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
In recent years, there has been increasing attention paid to the
need for evidence-based practice to improve health outcomes
worldwide (Pang et al., 2003). Research has focused on identifying
which policies work, but has also explored the processes by which
knowledge is translated to highlight potential bottlenecks for
evidence-based policy (Oliver et al., 2014). While a growing liter-
ature exists to explore the use of evidence in policy-making, there is
limited knowledge on how policies can be successfully translated
into effective practices. However, several studies (Chaudoir et al.,
2013; Durlak and DuPre, 2008) conﬁrm that implementation doeson WC1H 9SH, UK.
ertone).
r Ltd. This is an open access articleinﬂuence the outcomes of an intervention and highlight the
importance of understanding which factors affect implementation
by looking at elements both in the context outside the organisation
of focus and within the cultural and management features of the
organisation. The importance of ﬁlling the knowledge gap seems
even more relevant for complex health system interventions,
where the wider context can play a major role in inﬂuencing the
outcome of the policies. It is therefore essential to look beyond
policy-making to reﬂect on actual practices, and on how, by whom,
and why policies are potentially reshaped in the translation
process.
In this paper, we aim to analyse how features relating to the
context (structure) and the actors (agency) in three districts in
Sierra Leone inﬂuence the implementation of health workers'
incentive policies and deﬁne HRH practices at local level. Ourunder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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features and dynamics, and in particular the interactions between
District Health Management Teams (DHMTs) and nongovern-
mental organisations (NGOs), may have effects which contribute to
shape incentives for healthworkers in public facilities and, thus, the
functioning of the local health systems. Our focus is not on a speciﬁc
intervention, but broadly on HRH incentives, including the ofﬁcial
policies in place to regulate the incentive package for public health
workers, as well as the actual practices that inﬂuence the ﬁnancial
and non-ﬁnancial incentives effectively available for those health
workers. We believe that HRH incentive issues make a useful case
study to reﬂect on how deeply structural and agency features can
inﬂuence local-level practices in a key area, such as HRH. In order to
analyse the translation process at local level, we adopt a political
economy framework. The framework allows us to explore the
policy implementation, going beyond a static view of one organi-
sation (usually the DHMT), to look at the dynamics between the
layers of the structural context and the multiple actors and orga-
nisations that shape practices and deﬁne the incentive package
differently in each district.
This research was conducted just before the Ebola virus
epidemic started in Sierra Leone, in May 2014. Our ﬁndings high-
light some of the factors that may have played a role in the collapse
of the health system, as we point to in the concluding section.
Moreover, our research contributes to the reﬂection on the conse-
quences of the changing local dynamics as new players enter the
stage at district level as part of the Ebola response and post-Ebola
reconstruction, of which HRH incentive practices are an essential
component.
2. Context
Sierra Leone is aWest African country of 6million people, with a
GDP per capita of 613 USD in 2012 (IMF, 2013). Between 1991 and
2002, the country was ravaged by a civil war which left the public
health system in ruins (Gberie, 2005). Over the last decade, Sierra
Leone's health system underwent a process of reconstruction and
reform. However, the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) for
the 2008e2013 period ﬁnds that maternal mortality remains high
at 1165 deaths per 100,000 live births, while under-ﬁve mortality is
estimated at 156 per 1000 live births (SSL & ICF International,
2014). In terms of health workforce, in 2011 there were an esti-
mated 0.0071 doctors and 0.0631 nurses per 10,000 people in the
public sector (Wurie et al., 2014). The distribution of health workers
remains inequitable with major imbalances between rural and ur-
ban areas, and health workers attraction, retention and motivation
are a challenge (Witter et al., 2015).
We analysed elsewhere the trajectory and drivers of HRH policy-
making in the post-conﬂict period (Bertone et al., 2014). It emerged
that the launch of the Free Health Care Initiative (FHCI) in 2010
provided the momentum for the approval of a series of HRH re-
forms, which included a substantial salary uplift for all technical
staff of the Ministry of Health and Sanitation (MoHS), and the
cleaning of the MoHS payroll to eliminate ‘ghost workers’ and add
those working as ‘volunteers’. The HRH reform process continued
with the introduction of a Performance-based Financing (PBF)
scheme in 2011 (which includes a staff bonus) and a Remote
Allowance for health workers based in rural areas, in 2012. In
parallel to their support to the design, and in some cases the
funding, of these reforms, certain donors and NGOs adopted mea-
sures to ensure the alignment and rationalisation of the health
workers' incentive package. In particular, the World Bank and
Global Fund abolished supplementary payments to health workers
in charge of HIV/AIDS services. However, despite the relative suc-
cess of the decision-making process and the design of reforms, theirimplementation remained ﬁlled with challenges (Witter et al.,
2015).
3. Methods
The present research was undertaken in the districts of Kenema,
Bo and Moyamba (Fig. 1), which were purposefully selected to
maximize differences in poverty, urbanisation, type and remote-
ness of facilities, as well as number of NGOs.
This paper draws on a series of key informant interviews at
district level (n ¼ 18), carried out in SeptembereNovember 2013.
The interviews aimed to be as comprehensive as possible of actors
at local level, including DHMTs, as well as donors and local and
international NGOs' staff (Fig. 2). One NGO in Bo was not included
as not available for interviewing at district level, although some
information was collected from its representative at central level
and from secondary sources, and triangulated during interviews
with other actors in Bo. Moreover, key actors such as Members of
Parliament and politicians, civil society members and representa-
tives of Local Councils, who have some authority over health issues
under the on-going decentralisation process, were not interviewed,
nor havewe included in the analysis private and informal providers
of healthcare which also inﬂuence the incentives in the public
system (Ensor andWitter, 2001). This is due to the fact that initially
key informant interviews aimed solely at providing a background
to the broader research, focused on health workers at individual
level. However, the interactions between DHMTs and NGOs became
such a relevant and recurring theme that it was later developed into
a speciﬁc research question. The omission of actors external to the
health system and non-public providers is a major limitation of our
work.
The key informant interviews at district level are embedded in a
larger mixed-methods research, which aims to investigate the
health workers' ‘complex remuneration’ by quantifying their
overall income and exploring the consequences of income levels
and fragmentation. The broader researchmakes use of other data. A
longitudinal survey was carried out to collect information on rev-
enues (salary, remote allowance and PBF, as well as per diems and
salary top-ups, and informal incomes) for 266 primary healthcare
workers (90 in Kenema, 96 in Bo, 80 in Moyamba). The research
also involved prolonged ﬁeldwork (September 2013eMay 2014), a
series of in-depth interviews with health workers (n ¼ 39e13 in
Kenema, 12 in Bo, 14 in Moyamba), as well as an earlier docu-
mentary review and 23 key informant interviews at central level.
Although this study relies mostly on key informant interviews at
district level, the other sources of information were important to
inform the analysis. For example, preliminary results from the
health workers survey are included to support the ﬁndings from
key informant interviews. Ethical clearance for all research com-
ponents was obtained from the London School of Hygiene and
Tropical Medicine and the Sierra Leone Ethics and Scientiﬁc Review
Committee.
In order tomap the emerging elements and themes, the analysis
makes use of a political economy framework. This framework is
based on that proposed by Harris (2013), but slightly adapted to
take into consideration the fact that this research is not driven by a
pre-identiﬁed problem, but is rather exploratory in scope (Fig. 3).
Two main areas are identiﬁed as the subject of analysis e on the
one hand, the structural features which include the historical, cul-
tural, geographical context and the relevant ‘rules of the game’
(institutions), such as policies, regulations and social norms; on the
other, the agency features relating to themain actors, their interests,
incentives and relations of power, and the analytical concepts that
may explain actors' decision logics and behaviours. In particular, as
analytical concept, we apply ‘agency theory’, which describes a
Fig. 1. Maps of Sierra Leone's districts.
Fig. 2. Summary of characteristics of key informants at district level (n ¼ 18).
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person (agent). The principal typically faces problems in controlling
the agent, as (i) the agent's interest may differ from the principal's,
and (ii) the agent has better information than the principal on her
actions (Kiser, 1999). In economic theory, to minimise these issues,
a monitoring system and/or the alignment of incentives are needed
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Sociological and management theories deal
with more complicated situations as they loosen assumptions
allowing for multiple principals, multiple agents (which leads to
‘collective action problems’), as well as multiple interests of both
principals and agents e for example, agents may not be necessarily
self-interested, utility maximisers (which leads to ‘stewardship
theory’ (Perrow, 1986)). In our analysis, we will ﬁnd two interre-
lated sets of principaleagent relations, each riddenwith its speciﬁc
problems. Some of the dimensions indicated in the framework (e.g.,
cultural, social, geopolitical factors, climate change, technology) are
relatively little explored as our focus rest on the health sector-
speciﬁc dynamics.4. Findings
4.1. Structural features and context
Despite their proximity and the fact that they are all predomi-
nantly Mende in ethnic composition, the three districts are rather
different for historical legacies and contextual features, including
socio-economic and health indicators (Table 1). Kenema is a fairly
large district with vast rural areas, although Kenema Town is the
third city of Sierra Leone. Some of the diamond mining areas are
located in Kenema and the district was severely affected by the
conﬂict, with destruction of infrastructure and population
displacement. Bo is the second city of Sierra Leone and the most
urban and least poor district among the three (WB & SSL, 2013).
During the war, internally displaced people (IDP) camps were set
up and Bo witnessed the presence of health NGOs (one of which
still operating) engaged in directly providing health services to
those populations. Moyamba is the most rural and poorest district
among the three (second poorest in Sierra Leone) (WB& SSL, 2013).
Fig. 3. Analytical framework to explore the political economy dynamics at local level.
Source: Adapted from Harris (2013).
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ramidal way with a district hospital (and a second NGO-run hos-
pital in Bo e see below) and three types of primary-level facilities
(Peripheral Health Units e PHUs).4.2. Relevant formal institutions
Institutions are “the ‘rules of the game’ in a society or, more
formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human
interaction” (North,1990: p.3). They can be formal, such as laws and
regulations, and informal, i.e., accepted and stabilized political,
social and cultural practices, such as ‘patronage’ or the practice of
‘tipping’. For HRH in Sierra Leone, in spite of the on-going decen-
tralisation process, formal institutions aremostly set at central level
and apply uniformly across districts. The institutional framework to
regulate HRH issues is delineated in the Human Resource for Health
Policy and Human Resource for Health Strategic Plan 2012e2016.
However, our research highlights discrepancies between centrally-
deﬁned policies and practices on the ground as it reveals that
formal institutions (i.e., ofﬁcial policies) deﬁning the HRH incentive
structure are re-shaped both by implementation challenges com-
mon to the three districts, and by informal HRH incentive practices
at local level. Below we describe the implementation challenges
ﬁrst, then the district-speciﬁc actors, before exploring the dynamics
between them and the informal practices that emerge.
HRH reforms described in the context section have been
implemented in a very centralized way. Salary uplift and payroll
updating were managed by the Ofﬁce of the Payroll within theTable 1
Summary of basic socio-economic, demographic and health system information for the
District Area
(Km2)
Population
(World
Pop, n.d.)a
Poverty
headcount
(WB &
SSL, 2013)b
Rural HH
(WB &
SSL, 2013)b
Num. Of
PHUs
(MoHS)
Average
remoteness of
PHUsc (health
worker survey
Kenema 6053 569,300 62% 59% 116 2.01
Bo 5219 524,500 51% 55% 131 1.74
Moyamba 6902 320,900 71% 92% 99 2.66
a Projections for 2010 based on 2004 census.
b Data from Sierra Leone Integrated Household Survey 2011
c Scale from 0 (urban) to 4 e facilities included are a random sample of all PHUs in thMoHS. Little HRH management is performed at district level,
although in theory it is a function that has been devolved to
Councils and DHMTs. The DHMTs are responsible for the
deployment of health workers within their district, but HRH
management is not performed systematically as no staff within
the DHMT is speciﬁcally in charge of HRH. DHMTs have no control
over other HRH issues, including the skill mix of the staff they are
allocated, career progression and payment. Meanwhile, the
payroll in Freetown is increasingly imprecise and our survey
found that 15% of the sampled health workers are not paid. At the
same time, the PBF scheme's external veriﬁcation, carried out in
April 2014, reports delays of more than one year in payment of
PBF bonuses (Cordaid, 2014). As a consequence, health workers
have no insight into the relation between performance and pay-
ment. Internal veriﬁcation of PBF indicators is supposedly done
quarterly and jointly by DHMT and Local Councils. In practice,
only one third of Councils is involved (Cordaid, 2014), while
DHMTs face numerous logistic and time challenges to carrying it
out regularly. As a result, the veriﬁcation process is weak and the
external veriﬁcation found ﬁgures between 12% and 73% different
to those of the internal one (Cordaid, 2014). As for the remote
allowance, most respondents were unaware of its existence
altogether or of the ways it works. Cross-checking between sur-
vey, health workers' interviews and key informant interviews, it
emerges that payments were delayed since mid-2012 (soon after
its beginning) because of cash-ﬂow issues, and they stopped by
the end of 2012.
This description highlights the challenges in the implementa-
tion of the ofﬁcial HRH policies, which are related to operational
issues at central level, and in particular the slowness in adminis-
trative procedures, funding gaps and cash-ﬂow problems. However,
the general narrative from actors at central level remains one of
‘success’ of the FHCI and related reforms (Witter et al., 2015). On the
other hand, for actors operating at local level, the implementation
failures and the detachment of policy-makers from the reality of
the ﬁeld are a cause of frustration:
“The real key issue is that with all of these policies and all of
these strategies, none of them have been properly operational-
ised and none of them have stayed around. Like, in 2002, there
was a free health care policy announced for pregnant women,
lactating mothers, under 5, the elderly, disabled, all this, right,
and then it just didn't happen. So free health care is announced
again in 2010, and it's like, OK, it's happening, but is that going to
slowly start to fall apart? If PBF is announced, it's like, oh it
comes and then it stops, you know.” (international NGO).
As formal institutions fail (and are expected to fail), informal
institutions and practices emerge at local level.We introduce below
the main actors present at local level, their objectives and re-
lationships, before turning to the informal institutions.three districts.
)
Tot num. Of health
workers (MoHS
2013 e DHTM,
hospital and
PHU staff)
Deliveries in a
health facility
(SSL & ICF
International,
2014)
Under 5 mortality
(deaths per 1000
live births) (SSL &
ICF International,
2014)
Nutrition (children
under 5 years
who are stunted)
(SSL & ICF
International, 2014)
1134 77% 224 39%
908 72% 173 45%
346 33% 199 34%
e district.
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In Kenema, a few local and two main international NGOs oper-
ate in the health sector. One of these, a large humanitarian NGO, has
a holistic focus on the health sector and operates in three war-
affected districts (including Kenema) since the end of the conﬂict.
At the time of the research, its health activities were enacted
through the support to the public health system, covering all 121
Peripheral Health Units (PHUs) in the district and focussing in
particular on Maternal and Child Health (MCH). The NGO is rec-
ognised by the DHMT and other NGOs as the “driving force” in the
district (key informant e international NGO). Its activities include
provision of extra drugs and equipment for MCH, beyond those
distributed under the FHCI, support to communication and referral
system, including an ambulance for MCH emergencies. Looking
speciﬁcally at HRH, the NGO provides training, which entails per
diem payments to health workers, as well as supervision and
coaching to PHU staff through monthly visits (the DHMT only visits
facilities every quarter), which are focused on the same indicators
and checklist of the PBF scheme. The NGO used to provide a salary
supplementation to health workers employed in the public PHUs,
but ended this practice once the PBF scheme was introduced to
avoid the duplication (key informant e international NGO). How-
ever, the NGO still provides a monthly lump-sum payment to
DHMT, Council and Hospital staff who do not receive PBF payments,
as well as in-kind support for DHMTactivities, such as vehicles, fuel,
etc. for supervision and PBF veriﬁcation.
In Bo, the context is more fragmented as several NGOs have
divided up their activities roughly based on a geographical repar-
tition of the chiefdoms, although not all PHUs receive external
support. One international NGO with a humanitarian mission is
present, but was phasing-out its activities. It still runs a hospital at
the site of an IDP camp during the conﬂict where it provides clinical
services, and, while it used to include 110 facilities, it now supports
only a few public PHUs with drugs and equipment, and an ambu-
lance referral system. The health worker survey revealed that this
NGO is one of the few which still provides a salary supplement of
about 5e6% of the monthly salary to public health workers in the
supported PHUs. This payment has consequences for the DHMT's
ability to regulate the distribution of staff, as some health workers
refuse to move away from PHUs with where incentives (key
informant e DHMT). There are two other main NGOs in Bo, an in-
ternational and a local one. They both focus on MCH activities and
provide rehabilitation of infrastructure, equipment and drugs,
ambulance for referral, and mobile phones for communication to
some of the PHUs in the district. In terms of HRH activities, while
they both provide training and related per diems to the health
workers, none pays supplementary incentives. While the ﬁrst NGO
admits not to be able to carry regular supervisions, the second,
which only supports 13 facilities, is able to provide supervision and
coaching, which also aims to “equip PHUs so they get more PBF
money” (key informant e local NGO).
Finally, in Moyamba there are two main international NGOs in
the health sector, both focussing exclusively on nutrition, and
supporting 49 and 40 public PHUs respectively with overlaps in
some facilities. Both NGOs visit the public PHUs either monthly or
twice a month (while the DHMT reports to be visiting facilities
quarterly), but only on ‘feeding days’ in order to supervise those
activities. Joint NGO-DHMT supervisions also focus only on nutri-
tion services. There are no external actors supporting MCH activ-
ities and therefore PHUs receive no (extra) drugs or equipment, and
staff has little MCH supervision, training and no other payments
from external organisations.
Overall, the distribution of the NGOs between districts seems to
be deﬁned by historical legacies and patterns which emergedimmediately post-conﬂict, with large humanitarian NGOs estab-
lished in the conﬂict-afﬂicted districts of Kenema and Bo, and the
relatively recent NGO presence in Moyamba. Additionally, the
choice of focal activities and operational approaches seems to be
based on the NGO's own missions rather than on local health pri-
orities and needs.4.4. Relationships and balance of power
Relations between actors at district level are negotiated through
various committees, as well as bilateral meetings between the
DHMT and each NGO. Ofﬁcially, DHMTs are required to chair the
District Health Coordination Meeting (DHCC) which is supposed to
meet quarterly and is the main coordination forum, including the
DHMT, the Local Council and all health partners. In Kenema, the
DHCC appears to be meeting regularly, but one key informant
(DHMT) reports that this was not the case for the previous one or
two years. While in Bo the DHCC is reported to meet regularly, in
Moyamba it seems to have happened rarely, if ever. Other com-
mittees may be created ad hoc for different reasons, including
addressing donor's requirements. For example, in Kenema, an NGO
reported that another ‘stakeholder meeting’ is held quarterly and
explained that:
“The stakeholder meeting, we wanted it because it is in our
proposal to meet with district partners, whilst the DHCC is
theirs [of the DHMT]. But it is almost just like the same thing;
but the key difference is, ehm, this [stakeholder meeting] is
mainly [NGO] kind of programme focusing on reproductive
health issues. But the DHCC now is [focused on] all health things
and matters” (international NGO).
In other cases, NGOs prefer to hold bilateral meetings with the
DHMTs. In Moyamba, for example, the two main NGOs, although
both working on nutrition issues, prefer to address their concerns
directly with the DHMT rather than in multilateral meetings (key
informant e international NGO).
These interactions through bilateral meetings or committees are
clearly characterized by a substantial asymmetry of power, both
regarding ﬁnancial resources as well as access to information be-
tween the parties. On the one hand, DHMTs struggle to ensure the
coordination of activities to avoid duplications and balance prior-
ities and they have no lever to enforce it when NGOs are not willing
to engage. As they chronically lack funds even for tasks that they are
mandated to carry out by the MoHS (e.g., routine supervision, PBF
veriﬁcation, etc.), they have to rely on NGOs for support. As one
DHMT staff stated:
“[… ] at the end of the day, who pays the bride price calls for the
tune. [… ] They have their own priorities. [So] at times, as head
of the district, you need to strike the balance, because the NGO
world is a very powerful world [… ], so our own duty is to see
where you can tap into their resources” (DHMT).
On the other hand, depending on their approach or their donors'
requirements, NGOs either seek to align with DHMT and MoHS
policy or need, at least formally, the ofﬁcial support of the DHMT for
their activities. Providing the DHMT with in-kind donations (ve-
hicles, motorbikes, fuel, communication means, etc.) or cash al-
lowances to support its tasks, or at least those that match the NGO's
objectives and scope (geographical, disease-wise, missionewise,
etc.), becomes a bargaining tool to ensure the smooth running of
both NGO and DHMT activities. In this ‘bargaining’, DHMTs have
varying levels of oversight over the amount and timing of funding
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advance by NGOs:
“Even with our yearly planning, you ask them [NGOs] for their
own budget, what they plan to do, and it is very, very difﬁcult to
get it from them” (DHMT).
The result of the differences in objectives, resources and power
is an ‘unbalanced’ mutual dependency between DHMTs and NGOs,
which often leads to frustration on both sides.
4.5. Relevant analytical concepts to explore actors' incentives and
decision logics
To analyse these dynamics and the logic behind actors' behav-
iours (the last element of our framework), we found helpful to
explore elements of agency theory delineated above. While DHMTs
and NGOs are co-dependent for the implementation of activities,
they are not tied together in a principaleagent relation. Instead,
they act (at least, in theory) as agents for two different principals,
the MoHS and the funders/donors, respectively. Not only do the
usual agency problems apply to both cases, but for the case of in-
ternational NGOs an ample literature exists on the challenges
presented by multiple principals and accountabilities, ‘steward’
behaviour coupled with ﬁnancial, material pressures, and
competitive incentives resulting in collective action problems
(Cooley and Ron, 2002; Edwards and Hulme, 1996). Moreover,
although all principals should share the same overall objectives and
approaches, in reality these are slightly different, at least in the way
they are operationalised. This results in differences between the
two sets of principals and agents, for example, in activity focus
(speciﬁc diseases/conditions versus system approach), geograph-
ical targeting, long versus short-term planning and budgeting,
quantity of activities carried out versus quality, willingness to co-
ordinate, etc. Moreover, objectives and incentives of NGOs and
DHMTs are not perfectly aligned. For instance, some NGOs are
rewarded to reach a large number of beneﬁciaries, a target which is
not only difﬁcult to measure, but also does not take into account
quality issues and the speciﬁc features of the context, including the
need to avoid duplication with other NGOs. Some NGOs may be
required to coordinate with the DHMTandwork in partnership, but
the practice is rather unbalanced, as we showed, given the absence
of common planning and budgeting tools. In other cases, especially
if funded with own resources, NGOs have little reason to coordinate
with DHTMs. In conclusion, the misalignment of agendas and in-
centives of DHMTs and NGOs, who are accountable to different
principals, is reﬂected in their bargaining dynamics and objectives.
In turn, the bargain shapes local-level practices, including HRH
incentives.
4.6. Informal institutions and HRH incentive practices at local level
Because formal institutions deﬁning HRH incentives partially
fail when implemented or are expected to fail and, at the same
time, district-level actors continuously negotiate to achieve their
objectives, a set of informal institutions (i.e., established and stable
practices) emerge at local level. In the case of HRH incentives,
informal institutions take the form of selective supervisions and
support to some programs (e.g., PBF), as well as salary supple-
mentations and per diems paid to individual workers to provide
extra remunerations beyond those ofﬁcially set. Salary supple-
mentations and per diems have received attention in the health
literature, mostly for their disruptive effect. Speciﬁcally, salary
supplementations are discussed in relation to vertical disease-
focused programmes because of their potential to create parallelsystems (Brugha et al., 2010; Hanson, 2012; Mussa et al., 2013). Per
diems have been explored as ‘corrupt’ practices, with perverse
consequences for the health system's performance and governance
(Chene, 2009; Ridde, 2010; Vian et al., 2013).
At district level, informal HRH incentive practices have a key
function as they are used to achieve a better ﬁt between the health
workers' incentive package and the NGOs' objectives and agendas.
Because of this, they are deﬁned by the district-level actors' moti-
vations, resources and approaches, mediated by the negotiation
processes with the other actors, including the DHMT. Indeed, our
analysis shows that different local dynamics produce differential
HRH practices, inﬂuencing ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial incentives.
Provision of equipment and drugs, rehabilitation, and selective
supervision and coaching can act as non-ﬁnancial incentives,
improving the working environment and motivating those health
workers deployed where such support is in place and for the pro-
grammes/activities which have been selected. Moreover, access to
drugs can be a powerful ﬁnancial incentive for health workers if
there is room for misappropriation and informal sale. Finally, such
support can also entail a potential increase in PBF revenues, per
diems and top-ups. Based on the survey data, we observed a vari-
ation between individual health worker remuneration across dis-
tricts (although there are limitations to this analysis because
samplingwas representative of the entirety of PHUs in each district,
regardless of the proportion of those supported by the different
NGOs and because of other confounding factors), Table 2 provides
preliminary evidence of the impact of local-level dynamics on in-
dividual health workers' incomes.While the difference in salaries is
non-signiﬁcant across districts, in Kenema, the long-term presence
of a large NGO, working closely with the DHMT, and expanding its
coverage over time to include all PHUs with a clear focus on MCH
activities results, at individual level, in higher income from PBF,
whose indicators focus only on MCH, and higher per diems. In Bo,
the fragmentation of the support, with many PHUs not covered by
external organisations, results in substantially lower incomes
compared to Kenema both for PBF individual bonuses and per di-
ems. InMoyamba, where almost all PHUs are covered by NGOswith
a focus on nutrition, the picture is mixed, with the lowest income
levels from per diems, and PBF bonuses substantially lower than in
Kenema but higher than Bo. Ultimately, the different levels of
revenue for each component are reﬂected in the total income for
health workers, which is found to be unequal across districts.
5. Discussion
The analysis of the district-level dynamics shows the effects of
the interplay between structure (i.e., context, historical legacies and
formal and informal institutions) and agency (actors, agendas and
power relations) on HRH incentives. The ‘bargaining’ process be-
tween actors at local level and the informal practices it creates can
modify, substantially in some cases, the individual health workers'
incentive package. The result is a discrepancy between ofﬁcial HRH
incentive policies and actual practices.
The role of NGOs at district level emerges as one of the driving
factors in shaping HRH incentives. Similarly, Pfeiffer (2003) de-
scribes the model of collaboration between international NGOs and
primary healthcare in Mozambique. Although the focus is at indi-
vidual level (expatriate personnel and their local counterparts) and
on the social dynamics rather than political economy ones, he ﬁnds
that ofﬁcial coordination coexists with behind-the-scenes deal-
making which “hinged on the provision of extra ﬁnancial beneﬁts
to health workers in a new aid-speciﬁc patronage system” (Pfeiffer,
2003: p.732). In his ethnography of an aid project, Mosse (2004:
p.639) describes how development practices are “driven by amulti-
layered complex of relationships and the culture of organizations
Table 2
Average income of PHU staff from selected sources and total monthly income in the three districts (Leones).
District Income from PBF Income from per diems Income from salary Total income (incl. All sources of
revenue)
Mean [95% conf int] Mean [95% conf int] Mean [95% conf int] Mean [95% conf int]
Kenema 102,392 79,387 125,398 207,722 160,331 255,114 491,276 445,702 536,851 849,903 763,069 936,737
Bo 57,112 40,258 73,966 134,132 91,974 176,289 516,984 467,925 566,044 786,986 694,985 878,986
Moyamba 92,985 72,196 113,773 109,966 85,512 134,421 484,913 444,007 525,819 719,854 653,579 786,130
Note: 1 USD ¼ 4270 Leones (October 2013).
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maintain coherent representations of their actions as instances of
authorized policy, because it is always in their interest to do so”
(Mosse, 2004: p.639). Our cases highlight a similar pattern. The
district-speciﬁc context and dynamics shape HRH practices and re-
shape the health workers' incentive package deﬁned at central level
in different ways, while most NGOs strive to maintain a narrative of
alignment and harmonization with national policies and DHMTs.
On the other hand, though, NGOs are also accountable to their
funders. Often donors do not reward coordination (Pfeiffer, 2003)e
or if they do (as in our case in Kenema, in line with Mosse's point),
they impose coordination as a box to tick with the creation of a new
‘inclusive’ committee rather than by strengthening existing struc-
tures. The lack of coordination, combined with the unbalanced
mutual dependency between NGOs and DHMTs, is a cause of con-
stant frustration, as recounted by our key informants and described
in other studies (Gilson et al., 1994).
Coordination of the ‘unruly melange’ of external actors has long
been recommended (Buse andWalt, 1997). Most NGOs are aware of
this issue and some have signed a Code of Conduct (Health Alliance
International, 2008). Tellingly, three articles out of the six which
compose the Code refer to HRH practices, including hiring, remu-
neration and in-service training. However, such calls do not seem to
be sufﬁcient, if not accompanied at national level by strengthened
effort for coordination between ‘principals’ to ensure alignment of
incentives, and by the explicit consideration of the existence of
local-level practices. At the other end of the ‘bargaining’ process,
the role of the DHMT as agent for the MoH should be also carefully
considered, as it is central for stewardship, coordination and
priority-setting at district level. Since the Harare Declaration of
1987, the role of the Health District as a key agent for the func-
tioning of health systems and the delivery of primary health care
has been stressed, with the recommendation to decentralise
ﬁnancial and HRH management, and adopt district planning pro-
cesses (CoP Health Service Delivery, 2013). DHMTs have also been
at the centre of attention for their governance role to ensure
accountability both upward, i.e. towards higher-level health
administration agencies and the MoH, and downward, i.e. towards
the communities they serve (Cleary et al., 2013; Van Belle and
Mayhew, 2014). However, Van Belle and Mayhew (2014) note
how “constrained decision-spaces, inadequate resources and ca-
pacity hamper public accountability practices” of DHTMs, while
other studies highlight the prevalence of informal practices in HRH
management, because of the lack of power, resources and institu-
tional incentives to enforce formal rules (George, 2009).
In light of our ﬁndings, it seems essential to empower DHMTs
with tools to redress the power imbalances between them and the
external actors at local level, in order to create a more effective and
balanced ‘mutual dependency’. These tools include transparency in
budgeting and planning processes, increased ﬁnancial and human
resources, improved skills and capacity, widened decision-spaces,
and openly shared objectives and agendas. The current planning
process in Sierra Leone envisages a bottom-up approach with the
preparation of district plans which should feed into a national plan.
However, the preparation of district plans appears to the DHMTsthemselves a formal exercise based on pre-set and unrealistic
items, rather than an essential and locally-adapted tool. The result
is a wish-list of activities for which there is unsecure funding, given
the meagre DHMT resources and the unknown or unpredictable
NGOs activities and budgets (key informantdDHMT). In contrast,
realistic and contextualized planning, budgeting and reporting
should be strengthened under the DHMT leadership so that it
would (i) deﬁne in advance a plan of activities and tasks, based on
the nationally-deﬁned health priorities (rather than NGO/donor-
speciﬁc ones), adapted to the local context. Such plan should
leave enough room for ﬂexibility and adaptation to the evolving
context and potential stressors or emergencies (such as the Ebola
outbreak); (ii) identify those responsible to carry activities out and
when; and (iii) include all resources available, from internal and
external sources, in a transparent and predictable manner. The
latter could be done through district-level ‘basket funds’, pooling
resources available and envisaging a funding mechanism linked to
the accomplishment of each task, which would hold actors
accountable for their performance under the same contractual
framework. While this process would dramatically reduce the in-
ﬂuence of external partners, with reference to our HRH case, it
would, in parallel, improve the alignment of HRH practices to the
nationally-deﬁned incentive package, eliminating the room for
extra salary supplementation and differential support to national
policies, and standardizing per diem payments. Limiting the un-
balanced bargaining processes at local level would not only create a
more equal partnership between actors in the local health system,
which could beneﬁt HRH and other practices (including priority-
setting and service delivery), but could also improve governance
at local level and ensure the responsiveness and accountability of
DHMTs towards communities, civil society and patients alike.
From a methodological perspective, these ﬁndings stress the
importance of looking at both structural and agency factors (related
to multiple internal and external organisations), and exploring
their variation across contexts. If policy is political, implementation
is no less so (Morgan-Trimmer, 2014). This calls for the use of tools
that allow a closer look into the political economy to unravel them
in research programs, and to take them openly into consideration
when implementing programs (Brinkerhoff and Bossert, 2013;
Erasmus and Gilson, 2008). This analysis also shows that qualita-
tive tools and a ﬂexible political economy framework incorporating
elements of institutional economics can be useful to illuminate
these dynamics.
6. Conclusions
Our analysis looked at what happens in three districts of Sierra
Leone when HRH incentive policies established at central level are
translated into practice. We presented not only the formal in-
stitutions deﬁning the incentive package and how effectively (or
not) they are implemented at local level, but also analysed the
informal institutions and practices that emerged as the outcome of
the ‘bargaining’ process between the local health actors. We have
shown how the political economy dynamics between those actors
deﬁne incentives with effects that ultimately extend to the
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districts shows how differences in contexts and actors lead to
different HRH practices. The consequence is a discrepancy between
policy and practice, and inequalities across areas of the country.
Some scholars conclude that this discrepancy is intrinsic and
unavoidable (Mosse, 2004). We believe that it is possible to go
beyond this, if key actors at central level (government, MoH and
development partners) and at district level (local councils, DHMTs,
local and international NGOs) remain aware of these dynamics and
ensure that they are channelled in a way that, as much as possible,
contributes to the reinforcement of the health system. A more
careful attention to the role of DHMTs and NGOs as local health
actors, as well as the balance of powers between them within a
bargaining process turned into open and transparent planning, may
improve policy implementation. Moreover, research focussing on
the evaluation of interventions and their implementation must
carefully investigate these dynamics and adopt tools that allow for
their exploration.
In the current context of the Ebola virus epidemic afﬂicting Si-
erra Leone, our ﬁndings are particularly relevant. Indeed, some of
the weaknesses we highlighted may have played a role in the
collapse of health services induced by the outbreak. For instance,
the disconnect between central authorities and districts, the poor
provision of central support functions, the narrow mandates of
NGOs, and the rigid incentives related to pre-determined results
may have reduced the responsiveness and resilience of the local
health systems in the face of the Ebola challenge. Some scholars
have hinted at the heavy NGO involvement in healthcare in Sierra
Leone and Liberia as one of the reasons for the delay in the control
of the epidemic, because it removed from local governments the
responsibility of coordinating a single healthcare policy and
because of the lack of investment at the meso-level of health
administration (Abramowitz, 2014). As this analysis illuminates the
political economy dynamics that were shaped in the post-conﬂict
period, their legacies and impact on local practices, it can also
provide useful insights for the post-Ebola transition and health
system reconstruction.
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